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TORTS-OBSTRUCTION OF A CIVIL ACTION-COERCION BY A MEDICAL A1'r 
SOCIATION To PRECLUDE AVAILABILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN A MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE ACTION - Plaintiff approached nine physicians in an at-
tempt to secure an expert witness for a medical malpractice action.1 All 
nine refused, allegedly as a result of threats by the county medical as-
sociation to expel them and cause a cancellation of their malpractice 
liability insurance if they testified. The association's actions stemmed 
from a finding by its "malpractice committee" that the malpractice de-
fendant had not been negligent. Plaintiff then brought this action against 
the association to recover compensatory and punitive damages for obstruc-
tion of a civil action.2 On appeal from an order granting a motion for non-
suit, held, affirmed. No cause of action can arise from inducing one to as-
sert his legal rights.s Agnew v. Parks, (Cal. App. 1959) 343 P. (2d) 118. 
1 The plaintiff's f~t malpractice trial ended in a nonsuit, reversed on appeal. Agnew 
v. City of Los Angeles, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 616, 186 P. (2d) 450 (1947). The second resulted 
in a judgment for the defendant, reversed on appeal. Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 97 Cal. 
App. (2d) 557, 218 P. (2d) 66 (1950). The third trial, pending when the instant action 
was brought, resulted in a $37,883.91 judgment, affirmed on appeal, 134 Cal. App. (2d) 
433, 286 P. (2d) 566 (1955). 
2 A second cause of action was directed against the medical association and a Dr. Parks, 
for conspiracy to defraud. 
8 A second basis for the decision was a holding that the action was partially barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
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The expert testimony of a local physician is necessary to make out 
a prima fade case in virtually every malpractice action.4 It has been as-
serted that an awareness of this fact on the part of medical groups has in 
some instances resulted in the use of a "conspiracy of silence"5 as a 
means of stemming the surging tide of malpractice litigation.a The prin-
cipal case embodies the first direct action by a malpractice claimant 
against a medical association for damages as a result of its enforcement 
of such a "conspiracy." It is clear, as the court held, that an individual 
physician has no duty to testify upon the mere request of a claimant. A 
contrary result would mean that a claimant could indirectly compel ex-
pert testimony, a power which the law has placed within the discretion 
of the court.7 But the court's further conclusion, that simply because a 
physician has no duty to testify the actions of a third party8 forcing him 
not to testify are therefore necessarily lawful, seems unsound. While the 
actions of the medical association do not precisely fit into any nominate 
tort category, they do appear to fall within principles derived from close-
ly analogous cases. Where one party is in need of services which in the 
normal course of events would be available to him, a third party whose 
negligent intervention is the sole reason why such services are not forth-
coming has been held liable to the potential beneficiary for resulting 
damages, notwithstanding the fact that the potential source of such serv-
ices was under no legal duty to render them.9 The principal case presents 
4See 2 HARPER AND JAMF.S, TORTS §17.1, pp. 968, 969 (1956). Some moves have been 
made toward liberalizing the means whereby a plaintiff can get his case to the jury with-
out expert testimony, such as a broadened doctrine of res ipsa loquitur [e.g., Ybarra v. 
Spangard, 25 Cal. (2d) 486, 154 P. (2d) 687 (1944) ], an expansion of the field of "com-
mon knowledge" where the jury may fix the standard of care [e.g., Malone v. Bianchi, 
318 Mass. 179, 61 N.E. (2d) 1 (1945)] and statutes permitting the use of textbooks in lieu 
of expert testimony [e.g., Mass Laws Ann. (1949) c. 233, §79c]. However, expert testimony 
is still necessary in the vast majority of cases. 
5 See Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. (2d) 465 at 484, 234 P. (2d) 34 (1951) (dissent-
ing opinion). 
6 For a recent statistical treatment, see Stetler, "The History of Reported Medical 
Professional Liability Cases," 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 366 (1957). 
7 The court has the inherent power to compel testimony, including expert testimony 
[2 WIGI\IORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §563 (1940)], qualified in some jurisdictions by the re-
quirement of a tender of adequate compensation before an expert will be compelled to pre-
pare himself and to render expert opinion testimony. Note, 25 !LL. L. REV. 344 (1930). 
In California this power is codified in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1949) §1871. 
s The plaintiff labelled her action as one for conspiracy, but the court held that 
since there was no legal wrong, there could be no conspiracy to commit a legal wrong. Cf. 
PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 235 (1955). For the relevance of concerted actions in determining 
the existence of a legal wrong, see note 15 infra. 
9 See PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 188 (1955). In Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Simmons Co., 
167 Wis. 541, 168 N.W. 199 (1918), the defendant negligently ruptured the municipal 
water intake pipe, shutting off all water service. Seven days later, plaintiff's house caught 
on fire and was lost solely because of the lack of water. The facts that the municipality 
was not providing the service to the plaintiff when the defendant acted and that it had 
no duty to provide such services were held immaterial, and the defendant was held liable. 
See also Gilbert v. New Mexico Constr. Co., 39 N.M. 216, 44 P. (2d) 489 (1935). The same 
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an even stronger basis for liability since the defendant's intervention was 
intentional and since the services lost were admitted by the demurrer to 
be otherwise available to the plaintiff.10 Another line of authority would 
appear to be even more relevant.11 The acts of a trade12 or professional13 
association in unjustifiably14 coercing its members into a concerted boy-
cott15 of the trade or profession of another has been held actionable. As 
one writer states the rule, " ... it now seems generally agreed ... that 
there are certain types of conduct, such as boycotts, in which the element 
of concert adds such a power of coercion . . . that it makes unlawful 
acts which one man alone might legitimately do."16 Although these cases 
have arisen principally in the area of unfair competition, there seems to 
be little in principle to distinguish them from the principal case. On the 
one hand, a business is lost; on the other, a cause of action, but in both 
an unjustifiable internal group coercion has resulted in concerted action 
depriving another of the prospective advantage he was otherwise free to 
receive. In being deprived of voluntary ex.pert testimony, the plaintiff 
suffered an injury. While it is true that a court could subpoena expert 
testimony, although this is not a matter of right,17 a man who is forced 
to testify is not likely to be as favorable as one who agrees to do so, es-
pecially when the reason he does not appear voluntarily is that his medi-
cal association has actively condemned the plaintiff's claim. The medical 
profession is seriously and perhaps justifiably concerned about the present 
principle has been recognized in California in Hanlon Dry Dock &: S. Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 92 
Cal. App. 230, 268 P. 385 (1928), approved in Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Pacific 
Gas and Electric Co., 220 Cal. 515, 31 P. (2d) 793 (1934). 
10 Even absent such an admission, it would appear that as a rule expert testimony is 
available to a malpractice claimant. The large number of malpractice actions before the 
courts (see note 6 supra), virtually all involving expert testimony (see note 4 supra), 
coupled with the fact that the medical association felt it necessary here to take affirmative 
steps to preclude expert testimony from being given, attest to its availability in the normal 
course of events. 
11 See, generally, PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., §107 (1955) ("Interference with Prospective 
Advantage"). 
12E.g., Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N.E. 1085 (1904). 
13 E.g., Pratt v. British Medical Association, [1919] I K.B. 244. 
14 The presence or absence of justification in the traditional commercial boycott case, 
e.g., Martell v. White, note 12 supra, is usually determined by balancing the injury to the 
individual's freedom to carry on his trade against the interest of the association in engaging 
in free competition. In the principal case, the interests to be balanced are those of the 
association in insulating one of its members from legal liability as opposed to those of the 
plaintiff in obtaining the most favorable hearing of her claim that the law will allow, a 
balance clearly in the plaintiff's favor. 
15 It is by analogy to the commercial boycott cases that the element of concert becomes 
relevant. See note 8 supra. As Dean Prosser puts it, " ••. the individual is limited in 
the damage he can do by his own capacity for economic pressure or persuasion. A com-
bination has far greater potentialities of coercion, not only of others but also of its own 
reluctant members . ••. " PROSSER, TORTS, ,2d ed., §107, p. 755 (1955) (emphasis added). 
See also Wyman, "The Law as to Boycott," 15 GREEN BAG 208 (1903). 
16 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 236 (1955). 
17 See note 7 supra. 
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state of the law in the medical malpractice area.18 But its efforts to cor-
rect the situation should be within the law, perhaps in seeking remedial 
legislation. In the principal case, the county medical association, a some-
what less than impartial tribunal, tried the plaintiff's case against one of 
its members, found in favor of the member, and then used its unique 
position of power over every potential witness to insure that its decision 
would not be upset in a court of law. Surely no profession should be able 
to stand above the law by being permitted to determine for itself the 
professional liability of its members. Such, however, appears to be the 
result of the principal case. 
William Y. Webb 
18 For an extensive popular treatment of the reasons for the medical profession's con-
cern, see Silverman, "Medicine's Legal Nightmare," SAT. EVE. Posr, April 11 (p. 13), April 
18 (p. 31) and April 25 (p. 36), 1959. 
